\sec\si March 9, 1996, Saturday

Comint and Vietnam, and later interventions

--Now that DRV sources are available, it should be possible to find out what role VC penetration of the GVN played in the conflict.

Was penetration as great as some articles said? Wasn't one of these by Neal Sheehan? Anyway, an estimate of many thousands of penetrators.

Much more is known now about high-level double agents; heads of agencies, journalistic sources. What role?

What is the whole story of Chau's brother? See Sheehans' article, interviewing him. Ask Chau.

[for my memoir: the Chau story! See Cook and Richardson. See Nixon interest in Cook. See journalists: Doyle, Armed Services News or something.]

- --What role did SI play, finally, on our side? Recall McN desire to use SI--actually, signal analysis--for the White Paper. What was the truth about: Hanoi control of the VC, in 1961, 1964 and later;
- --in what detail; at what levels; how much independence of NLF, VC?
 - --what was the story on COSVN? In 1969?
- --did SI ever get better, after 1961 or so? Was it really Burgess and McLean that led to better codes by DRV then?
 - --did the VC use SI effectively against ARVN, or US?
 - --How much was SI used by the US vs. ARVN and GVN?
- --Didn't the Chinese, and Soviets, help the VC and NVA with SI?
- --What did SI tell us about the likelihood of Chinese intervention under various circumstances? Did LBJ have this basis for worrying?
- --Was there (not) an SI version of the PP? Ask Gelb (ha). Check with the source I gave to Hersh.
- --What was the "crime" it revealed about HAK and RN in 1968? (Wouldn't that have been after PP were completed? Or,

did SI version <u>cover a longer period?</u> (This could be the secret of what HAK and RN were so worried about! re PP and re me!) See Corson, and Rose Kushner.

--What role did SI play, what did it reveal, in:

--Gulf War (probably, a great deal: crucial.) Reflected in books? Did it or did it not reveal how many Iraqi troops had deserted?

--On Gulf War, by the way: what do books reveal about plans to attack <u>before</u> the November election? What were pros and cons? Would those have led to many casualties? Who pressed for delay and change?

--Did Schwarzkopf actually request a high-level nuclear burst for blackout? How seriously was this considered? (Example of nuclear burst that would not violate laws of war! And how about nuclear ABM burst? Anti-satellite? Do nuclear states-including Israel, India, Pakistan-have these in mind when they defend some use of nuclers? Did they argue these to the World Court, against calling all use illegal, or all first use? Is this a factor in resistance to foregoing first use? Is it ever referred to covertly, in specialized circles? Note the unwillingness of the Establishment ever to refer to this--i.e., blackout--in public. (?)

- --Somalia
- --Haiti
- --Grenada
- --Panama

--WSEG studies did not consider SI. Were comparable SI crisis studies ever done?

--Read available books on SI in WWII and later: Enigma, Magic, Purple...

Would there be less tolerance currently about my revealing this stuff, given my past clearance, than before? In current climate of approval for intelligence, etc.

Is SI the basis for confidence that US can continue to run the world? To be the superpower? How about, expanded capabilities for this?

Ask Hershberg: Is he aware of, is he investigating, the contibutions and effects of SI on the US-SU relationship?

Ask Kai Bird, others in Historical Societies, Sherwin, Bart

<u>Bernstein</u>, how much they are aware of this dimension of history?
See Hiroshima.

In Cuba II: relative <u>lack</u> of useful role of SI. And see, accident at SAM site. How did this come out? What of "casualties...I am attacking... (or was it "advancing"?)

Tell Sy about later research on this; have him find out, how it came out. Hershberg...

Kai: especially investigate Bill Bundy's relation to SI, Bletchley Park and later. And see him on: Tonkin Gulf. On invasion plans before Cuba II, McG.